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ZIVOTOFSKY v. KERRY: CHOOSING INTERNATIONAL
REPUTATION OVER SEPARATION OF POWERS
HANNAH COLE-CHU ∗
In June 2015, the United States Supreme Court decided Zivotofsky v.
Kerry. 1 In Zivotofsky, the Court considered the constitutionality of Section
214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003, which permitted
a United States citizen born in Jerusalem to record the birthplace on his or
her passport as “Israel.” 2 Menachem Biyamin Zivotofsky, a United States
citizen, was born in Jerusalem soon after the statute was enacted, and his
parents applied for a passport and a Consular Report of Birth Abroad on his
behalf. 3 They requested that the United States Embassy record his
birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel.” 4 The embassy refused, citing U.S. State
Department policy authorizing it to designate only “Jerusalem” as the
birthplace on passports of United States citizens born in Jerusalem. 5
Seeking to enforce Section 214(d), Zivotofsky’s parents brought suit.6
After more than a decade litigating the justiciability of Zivotofsky’s
claims, the Supreme Court reached the merits of the case. 7 Zivotofsky
argued that the United States violated his statutory right to record his
birthplace as “Israel” on his passport, which Congress conferred on him
pursuant to its Article I lawmaking power. 8 The United States responded
that the statute was unconstitutional because it infringed on the President’s
exclusive power to recognize foreign sovereigns. 9 Specifically, Section
214(d) contradicted the President’s longstanding policy of neutrality over
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1. 135 S. Ct. 2076 (2015).
2. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d),
116 Stat. 1350, 1365–66 (2002), declared unconstitutional by Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076
(2015).
3. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, Nos. 03-1921, 03-2048, 2004 WL 5835212, at *1
(D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004), rev’d, 444 F.3d 614 (2006).
7. See infra Part I.
8. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083.
9. Id. at 2084.
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the status of Jerusalem. 10 The Court sought to determine whether the
President had the exclusive recognition power, and, if so, whether Section
214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 2003 infringed on that
power. 11
Ultimately, the Zivotofsky Court struck down the statute. 12 The
majority held that the President has the exclusive power to recognize
foreign sovereigns and determine recognition policy, and that Congress
could not force the President to contradict formal statements of
recognition. 13 The Court reasoned that the United States must have a single
recognition policy announced by “one voice,” and that voice must be the
President’s. 14 The Court determined that Section 214(d), in allowing
United States citizens born in Jerusalem to record their birthplace as
“Israel,” forced the President to contradict his position of neutrality as to the
status of Jerusalem. 15 For this reason, the statute was unconstitutional.16
In Zivotofsky, the Court confronted a remarkable legal panorama. At
first glance, Zivotofsky was a separation of powers case involving a dispute
over power between Congress and the President. The precise configuration
of the dispute, however, was unique. First, Zivotofsky involved the very
rare occasion in which the President intentionally contravened an act of
Congress. 17 Zivotofsky was also remarkable because virtually no legal
precedent existed to guide the Court’s analysis of the scope and allocation
of the recognition power. 18 Historical practice of the recognition power,
moreover, was sufficiently inconsistent that it did not provide any guidance
as to how the power should be allocated.19
Additionally, Zivotofsky was a separation of powers case in the realm
of foreign affairs. The debate over the division of power between Congress
and the President in foreign affairs is as old as the Nation itself and, without
doubt, remains unresolved. 20 Supreme Court precedent is infused with
competing and contradictory theories of separation of powers, and it
provides what seems, at times, rudderless guidance.21 Finally, Zivotofsky

10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.

Id.
Id. at 2081.
Id. at 2096.
Id. at 2094–95.
Id. at 2086.
Id. at 2094.
Id. at 2096.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.A.
Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2091.
See infra Parts II.B., IV.A–B.
See infra Part II.B.
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implicated the ancient conflict over the status of Jerusalem, arguably the
most sensitive international conflict in the world.22
Acknowledging the significant doctrinal challenges and sensitivity of
the issue in Zivotofsky, this Note argues that the Court erred in striking
down Section 214(d). 23 The Court correctly held that the President has the
exclusive power to effect recognition and determine recognition policy. 24
The Court erred, however, in holding that Congress may not force the
President to contradict statements regarding recognition. 25 This rule, which
defines what constitutes “infringement” of the recognition power,
encompasses otherwise constitutionally enacted legislation and
impermissibly invades Congress’s Article I legislative powers. Instead, the
Court should have limited its definition of infringement only to the exercise
of the recognition power itself by any branch other than the President. 26
Accordingly, Section 214(d), which was not a formal act of recognition, did
not infringe on the President’s exclusive recognition power. 27 Moreover,
the statute is independently constitutional under the Foreign Commerce
Clause. 28
In Zivotofsky, the Court also seized an opportunity to decide issues
completely separate from the merits of Zivotofsky’s claims. The Court
corrected two of the greatest flaws in foreign affairs jurisprudence: Justice
Sutherland’s theory of inherent executive power and his mischaracterization
of the sole organ theory—both introduced by United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp. 29 In doing so, the Zivotofsky Court signaled a shift in
the theoretical framework through which it has decided foreign affairs cases
towards a more balanced theory of separation of powers in foreign affairs. 30
I. THE CASE
In 2002, Congress passed the Foreign Relations Authorization Act (the
“Act”). 31 Section 214(d) of the Act provides: “[f]or purposes of the
registration of birth, certification of nationality, or issuance of a passport of
a United States citizen born in the city of Jerusalem, the Secretary shall,
upon the request of the citizen or the citizen’s legal guardian, record the

22. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2081.
23. See infra Part IV.C–D.
24. See infra Part IV.B–C.
25. See infra Part IV.C.
26. See infra Part IV.C.
27. See infra Part IV.C.
28. See infra Part IV.D.
29. 299 U.S. 304 (1936). See infra Part IV.A.
30. See infra Part IV.A.
31. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, 116 Stat.
1350 (2002).
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place of birth as Israel.” 32 Shortly thereafter, Menachem Binyamin
Zivotofsky was born in Jerusalem to Ari Zivotofsky and Naomi Siegman,
both United States citizens.33 In December 2002, Zivotofsky’s mother went
to the American Embassy in Tel Aviv to apply for a passport and a
Consular Report of Birth Abroad 34 on her son’s behalf, and requested that
the documents record his birthplace as “Jerusalem, Israel.” 35 The Embassy
refused, explaining that U.S. State Department policy would only permit
“Jerusalem” to be listed as Zivotofsky’s birthplace.36
Seeking to enforce Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations
Authorization Act, Zivotofsky’s parents filed suit against the Secretary of
State in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia in
2003. 37 Zivotofsky sought a declaratory judgment, claiming that the
Secretary of State’s failure to follow the mandate of Section 214(d)
breached a duty owed to Zivotofsky. 38 Additionally, Zivotofsky sought an
injunction ordering the Secretary of State to issue a Consular Report of
Birth Abroad and a U.S. passport recording “Jerusalem, Israel,” as
Zivotofsky’s birthplace, and to order consular personnel at U.S. embassies
and consulates to comply with Section 214(d). 39 Approximately one month
after Zivotofsky filed his complaint, U.S. citizen parents of another child
born in Jerusalem, E.O. Odenheimer, filed a Writ of Mandamus in the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia, bringing similar
claims against the Secretary of State. 40 Because of the common issues
presented, the district court consolidated the two cases.41
The Government moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ claims on several
grounds, including that Zivotofsky and Odenheimer lacked standing, the
case presented a nonjusticiable political question, and the statute was
permissive rather than mandatory. 42 In a brief opinion, the district court

32. § 214(d), 116 Stat. at 1366.
33. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015).
34. A Consular Report of Birth Abroad is “a formal document certifying the acquisition of
U.S. citizenship at birth of a person born abroad.” U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 7 FAM § 1441(a) (2015),
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/07FAM/07FAM1440.html. The abbreviation “FAM” is short for
“Foreign Affairs Manual.”
35. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2083.
36. Id.
37. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, Nos. 03-1921, 03-2048, 2004 WL 5835212, at *2
(D.D.C. Sept. 7, 2004), rev’d, 444 F.3d 614 (2006).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id. Among several claims, Odenheimer’s parents argued that the Secretary of State
breached a duty to Odenheimer by failing to comply with § 214(d), and violated Odenheimer’s
equal protection and due process rights. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id.
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held that Zivotofsky’s and Odenheimer’s claims were not justiciable.43
First, the court held that the Secretary of State’s failure to record
“Jerusalem, Israel” on the plaintiffs’ passports was not an injury in fact
sufficient to confer standing. 44 Second, the district court held that the
plaintiffs’ claims constituted a nonjusticiable political question. 45 A core
issue in the case, the court reasoned, was the authority to recognize
sovereigns and conduct foreign policy—a power constitutionally committed
to the President.46 As such, the case fell within the ambit of the defining
political question case, Baker v. Carr,47 and cases establishing that the
recognition of sovereigns is committed to the Executive. 48 Therefore,
because the cases were not justiciable, the district court dismissed the
plaintiffs’ claims. 49
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit reversed the district court’s holding and ruled that
Zivotofsky had standing. 50 Relying primarily on Linda R.S. v. Richard
D., 51 the court of appeals explained that Congress conferred a statutory right
on Zivotofsky to record “Israel” as his birthplace on his passport, which
was violated when the Secretary of State refused to do so, and this violation
was sufficient to show standing. 52 The court of appeals also held that the
district court’s basis for ruling that Zivotofsky’s claim constituted a
political question was incorrect.53
Specifically, the district court
erroneously framed the issue in the case as implicating the recognition
power, which is solely a function of the President. 54 Instead, the issue was
whether Section 214(d) entitled Zivotofsky to have “Israel” listed as his
place of birth on his passport and Consular Birth Report, and, if so, whether

43. Id. at *4.
44. Id. at *3. The court argued that “the mere existence of a statute does not negate ‘the
requirement that the party seeking review must himself have suffered an injury.’” Id. (quoting
Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 738 (1972)).
45. Id. at *4.
46. Id.
47. 369 U.S. 186, 212 (1962) (“recognition of foreign governments . . . strongly defies
judicial treatment”).
48. Zivotofsky, 2004 WL 5835212, at *4 (citing Goldwater v. Carter, 617 F.2d 697, 707–08
(D.C. Cir. 1979) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 444 U.S. 996 (1979); United States v. Cty.
of Arlington, 669 F.2d 925, 929 (4th Cir. 1982)).
49. Zivotofsky, 2004 WL 5835212, at *4.
50. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 444 F.3d 614, 619 (D.C. Cir. 2006), remanded to 511 F.
Supp. 2d 97 (D.D.C. 2007).
51. 410 U.S. 614, 617 n.3 (1973) (“Congress may enact statutes creating legal rights, the
invasion of which creates standing, even though no injury would exist without the statute.”).
52. Zivotofsky, 444 F.3d at 619 (citing Linda R.S., 410 U.S. at 617 n.3).
53. Id.; see supra notes 43–46 and accompanying text.
54. Zivotofsky, 444 F.3d at 619.
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this right was mandatory or advisory. 55 The court of appeals remanded the
case to develop the record on this issue.56
On remand, the parties engaged in discovery and filed dispositive
motions on the political question issue. 57 The district court again held that
Zivotofsky’s claims presented a political question and dismissed the case. 58
Zivotofsky appealed a second time, and the court of appeals affirmed. 59
This time the court of appeals framed the issue as “whether the State
Department [could] lawfully refuse to record [Zivotofsky’s] place of birth
as ‘Israel’ in the face of a statute that directs it to do so.” 60 The court
concluded that it could not reach this issue, however, because the
President’s recognition power is exclusive, and policy decisions implicating
the recognition power are nonjusticiable political questions. 61 Section
214(d)’s requirement, the court explained, implicated one of those policy
decisions. 62 In a lengthy concurring opinion, one judge argued that judicial
review was appropriate and required only that the court determine whether
Section 214(d) was constitutional.63 The statute was unconstitutional, the
judge concluded, because it infringed on the exclusive recognition power of
the President. 64
Zivotofsky filed a petition for writ of certiorari, which the United
States Supreme Court granted on May 2, 2011.65 The issues before the
Court were whether Zivotofsky’s claim constituted a nonjusticiable political
question and, if not, whether Section 214(d) impermissibly infringed on the
President’s power to recognize foreign sovereigns. 66
In what would ultimately be the first of two Zivotofsky opinions, the
Supreme Court held that Zivotofsky did not constitute a nonjusticiable
political question. 67 The Court explained that the lower courts improperly
framed the issue as requiring a determination of whether Jerusalem is the
55. Id.
56. Id. at 620.
57. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 511 F. Supp. 2d 97, 101 (D.D.C. 2007), aff’d, 571 F.3d
1227 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
58. Zivotofsky, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 102. The district court held that Zivotofsky presented an
issue (A) textually committed to the political branches of the government; (B) lacking judicially
manageable standards for resolving the issue; and (C) impossible to resolve without expressing
lack of respect to coordinate branches of government. Id. at 103–05.
59. Zivotofsky, 571 F.3d at 1233, reh’g en banc denied, 610 F.3d 84 (D.C. Cir. 2010), rev’d,
132 S. Ct. 1421 (2012).
60. Id. at 1230.
61. Id. at 1231.
62. Id. at 1233.
63. Id. at 1240 (Edwards, J., concurring).
64. Id. at 1245.
65. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 131 S. Ct. 2897 (2011) (mem.).
66. Id.
67. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S. Ct. 1421, 1426–27, 1430 (2012), remanded to 725 F.3d
197, 214 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
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capital of Israel.68 Instead, the issue in the case was whether Section 214(d)
was constitutional, the determination of which depended on whether the
statute impermissibly intruded upon presidential power.69 Determining the
constitutionality of a statute, the Court explained, was precisely within the
purview of the judiciary and, as a result, the case was justiciable. 70 The
Court declined to discuss the merits of Zivotofsky’s claims, and instead
vacated judgment and remanded the case to the court of appeals to address
the constitutionality of Section 214(d). 71
Before the D.C. Circuit for the third time, the court held that Section
214(d) was unconstitutional because the President has the exclusive power
to recognize or withhold recognition of a sovereign, and Section 214(d)
infringes on that power. 72 The court relied on longstanding post-ratification
history, Supreme Court precedent, and the proposition that “the President
has ‘a degree of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone involved.’” 73 Because
Section 214(d) “runs headlong into a carefully calibrated and longstanding
Executive branch policy of neutrality toward Jerusalem,” the statute was
unconstitutional. 74
Zivotofsky again filed a writ of certiorari, which the U.S. Supreme
Court granted. 75 The first issue before the Court was whether the President
has the exclusive power to grant formal recognition to a foreign
sovereign. 76 The second issue was whether, in the event the President has
the exclusive recognition power, Congress can command the President to
issue a formal statement that contradicts the earlier recognition.77
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Several intersecting constitutional analyses determine the outcome of
the issues in Zivotofsky. First, though courts have dealt peripherally with
the recognition power in a handful of cases, none involve a dispute between
Congress and the President over the scope and nature of the recognition
power. 78 This remarkable lack of legal authority leads to the second area of
68. Id. at 1427.
69. Id. at 1428.
70. Id. (citing Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 878 (1991)).
71. Id. at 1431.
72. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 725 F.3d 197, 214, 220 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 135 S.
Ct. 2076 (2015).
73. Id. at 211 (quoting Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 445 (1998) (quoting
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936)).
74. Id. at 220.
75. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 134 S. Ct. 1873 (2014) (mem.).
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. See infra Part II.A.
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analysis: how the United States Supreme Court has historically determined
constitutional power in the realm of foreign affairs. 79 The Constitution
enumerates few powers relating to foreign affairs and, as a result, the Court
relies heavily on theories of separation of powers to determine the outcome
of foreign affairs cases. 80 At different points in history, however, the Court
has applied different theories to define congressional and presidential power
in foreign affairs. 81 As a result, jurisprudence regarding foreign affairs is at
best inconsistent and at worst irreconcilable.
Independent of recognition, Congress and the President share the
power to regulate passports. 82 Though the Court has never ruled on
Congress’s constitutional authority to enact passport legislation, Congress
has enacted many passport laws and the Court, in substantial part, has
assumed the constitutionality of those laws.83 Moreover, Congress has
broad authority to regulate the channels and instrumentalities of foreign
commerce through the Foreign Commerce Clause of Article I. 84
A. No Binding Legal Precedent Exists Involving a Dispute Between
Congress and the President over the Recognition Power
“Recognition is the act by which ‘a state commits itself to treat an
entity as a state or to treat a regime as the government of a state.’” 85 A
formally recognized foreign country may bring suit in United States
courts, 86 benefit from the act of state doctrine,87 and exercise sovereign
immunity. 88 An act of recognition is retroactive and “validates all actions
and conduct of the government so recognized from the commencement of
its existence.” 89 Furthermore, formal recognition allows for the initiation of
official diplomatic relations. 90 Determinations of recognition are binding
on the judiciary, and are not subject to judicial review. 91 Courts may,
however, discuss the legal consequences of recognition. 92
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.C.
See infra Part II.D.
Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 725 F.3d 197, 205 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 94(1) (1965)).
86. Guar. Tr. Co. of New York v. United States, 304 U.S. 126, 137 (1938).
87. Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297, 302–03 (1918); Underhill v. Hernandez, 168
U.S. 250, 253 (1897).
88. Nat’l City Bank of New York v. China, 348 U.S. 356, 358–59 (1955).
89. United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 328 (1937).
90. Guar. Tr. Co. of New York, 304 U.S. at 138.
91. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410–11 (1964)
(explaining that the judiciary may not permit a government not recognized by the executive
branch to file suit because that could be construed as an act of judicial recognition); Nat’l City
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Despite the importance of the recognition power to international
relations, very little primary legal authority discusses it. The text of the
Constitution does not contain any express reference to the recognition
power, and scant historical evidence provides little indication the Framers
intended to commit the recognition power to any one branch of the federal
government. 93 Moreover, the Court has never addressed a dispute between
Congress and the President over the scope and nature of the recognition
power. Supreme Court precedent involving the recognition power holds
that only the federal government may exercise the recognition power,94 but
the Court’s statements of how that power is allocated within the federal
government consists of conflicting dicta. 95 Some cases define the
recognition power as shared between Congress and the President.96 Other
cases state that the recognition power is exclusively the domain of the
President. 97 Notably, the distribution of the recognition power within the
Bank of New York, 348 U.S. at 358 (declining to review the status of the Republic of China
because it was “outside the competence of [the] Court”); Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302 (quoting Jones v.
United States, 137 U.S. 202, 212 (1890) (holding that recognition policy is conclusively binding
on a court)); Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839) (holding that the assumption of
sovereignty of a foreign country is binding on courts); United States v. Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.)
610, 634–35 (1818) (arguing that any decision by a court that constitutes an act of recognition
would “transcend the limits prescribed to the judicial department”).
92. Guar. Tr. Co. of New York, 304 U.S. at 139.
93. Zivotofsky v. Secretary of State, 725 F.3d 197, 206–07 (D.C. Cir. 2013), aff’d, 135 S. Ct.
2076 (2015). On remand, the D.C. Circuit explained that the Federalist papers make no mention
of the recognition power and there is no record that recognition was discussed at the
Constitutional Convention. Id. The only ratification-era evidence discussing the recognition
power, the court argued, was a writing by Hamilton in 1793, published under the name
“Pacificus” declaring that the “receive ambassadors” clause gave the President power over
recognition. Id. (citing United States National Archives, Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793),
http://founders.archives.gov/?q=pacificus&s=1111311111&sa=&r=7&sr=).
94. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942). In Pink, the Court held that a state may
not reject an act of recognition by the federal government because “[s]uch power is not accorded a
State in our constitutional system,” and to allow it would be a “dangerous invasion of Federal
authority.” Id.; see also United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331–32 (1937) (holding that
federal action in foreign affairs is binding on state constitutions, laws, and policies).
95. See infra notes 96–97 and accompanying text.
96. Guar. Tr. Co. of New York, 304 U.S. at 137 (“[Recognition] . . . is to be determined by
the political department of the government.”); Oetjen, 246 U.S. at 302 (explaining that the
sovereignty of a nation “is a political question” to be determined “by the legislative and executive
departments”); Palmer, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) at 645 (“[T]he courts of the union must view such
newly constituted government as it is viewed by the legislative and executive departments of the
government of the United States.”) .
97. See, e.g., Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 410 (1964) (“Political
recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive.”); Nat’l City Bank of New York v. China,
348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955) (holding that recognition is a “matter for determination by the
Executive”); Pink, 315 U.S. at 229 (holding that the President has the power to both determine a
policy of recognition and then make that determination); Belmont, 301 U.S. at 330 (explaining it
“may not be doubted” that the President has power to implement policies to effect recognition);
Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co., 38 U.S. 415, 420 (1839) (holding that the executive branch of the
government, “charged” with managing foreign relations, makes determinations of recognition).
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federal government was not at issue in any of these cases. Instead, existing
case law involving the recognition power involves state or judicial action
implicating recognition.98
B. Supreme Court Precedent Discussing Presidential Power in
Foreign Affairs Is Inconsistent Because the Court Has Relied on
Multiple Theories of Separation of Powers
The text of the United States Constitution enumerates few powers
relating to foreign affairs. The President is the Commander in Chief 99 and
has the duty to receive ambassadors from other nations. 100 Congress has the
power to regulate foreign commerce, raise armies, issue letters of marque
and reprisal, and to declare war. 101 The President and Congress share the
power to enter into treaties, and appoint ambassadors and other public
officials. 102 Because the actual conduct of foreign affairs involves much
more than the text of the Constitution expressly contemplates, conflicts
regularly arise between Congress and the President over how this power is
allocated. 103 When the political branches resort to the courts to resolve a
dispute over power in foreign affairs, the Court, often without guidance
from the text of the Constitution, routinely relies on theories of separation
of powers to determine the outcome of the dispute.104
At different points in history, however, the Court has invoked different
theories of separation of powers to resolve conflicts between Congress and
the President. Indeed, the Court’s two most famous foreign affairs
98. See supra notes 91 & 94.
99. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.
100. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3, cl. 3.
101. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
102. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
103. One significant exception to this proposition exists, which is of particular importance to
Zivotofsky: the President’s role as the sole organ of communication with foreign nations has not
been subject to significant challenge in the courts. See infra Part IV.B. The doctrine, also called
the “one voice” doctrine, most commonly appeared in foreign commerce cases as a rationale for
prohibiting states from participating in foreign commerce. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Cty. of
Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434, 451 (1979) (holding that courts should consider the extent to which a
commerce law “prevents the Federal Government from ‘speaking with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments’”); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 330
(1937) (holding that the President has power to effect recognition “as the sole organ of [the
federal] government”). The sole organ doctrine has also been referred to as a textually committed
power of the President not subject to review by courts. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 211–12
(1962) (explaining that not all foreign affairs cases present political questions, but some demand a
“single-voiced statement of the Government’s views”). See generally Zadvydas v. Davis, 533
U.S. 678, 700, 711 (2001) (noting the importance that the nation “speak with one voice”); Crosby
v. Nat’l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363, 381 (2000) (arguing that the issue in the case
“compromise[s] the very capacity of the President to speak for the Nation with one voice in
dealing with other governments”); Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)
(same).
104. See infra notes 105–106.
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decisions appear to be diametrically opposed. In United States v. CurtissWright Export Corp., a case challenging President Truman’s exercise of
unilateral action during the Korean War, the Court declared that the
President has inherent and plenary authority to conduct the Nation’s foreign
affairs. 105 Sixteen years later, however, in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 106 Justice Jackson stated in his canonical concurring opinion that
the President’s power to act in any situation—including in foreign affairs—
depends on its “disjunction or conjunction” with the powers of Congress. 107
What distinguishes these and other Supreme Court cases involving foreign
affairs are the underlying theories that guide the Supreme Court to reach its
conclusion. One holds that the President has broad and inherent power, and
the other subjects presidential power to the control of Congress.108 CurtissWright and Youngstown, each with its own legacy, represent the everpresent and unresolved debate over separation of powers in foreign
affairs. 109
In the early years after the Constitution was ratified, the Court viewed
presidential power in foreign affairs as almost completely dependent on
express congressional authorization and, therefore, strictly construed all
delegations of power. 110 The President was prohibited from acting in
foreign affairs without a statutory delegation of power 111 or other
authorizing act, such as declaring war. 112 The Court eventually recognized
one narrow instance when the President could act unilaterally: to repel
immediate and internal attacks. 113 Against this background, Curtiss-Wright
marked the introduction of a drastically different view of presidential power
in foreign affairs: the President has inherent power to conduct foreign
105. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
106. 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
107. Id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
108. To quote Justice Jackson in Youngstown, this dichotomy of presidential power is an
“over-simplified grouping.” Id. It is, nevertheless, a useful framework through which to review
foreign affairs precedent as it relates to Zivotofsky.
109. Justice Jackson noted in Youngstown, “A century and a half of partisan debate and
scholarly speculation yields no net result but only supplies more or less apt quotations from
respected sources on each side of any question. They largely cancel each other.” 343 U.S. at
634–35 (Jackson, J., concurring).
110. See, e.g., Talbot v. Seeman, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 1, 28–29 (1801) (upholding the U.S.
recapture of a French vessel based exclusively on statutory grants of power and explaining that
“the whole powers of war” are vested in Congress and one must examine “acts of congress” to
understand American hostilities with France); United States v. Smith, 27 F. Cas. 1192, 1229–30
(C.C.N.Y. 1806) (No. 16,342) (holding that despite the President’s approval of a secret mission,
the Constitution does not vest the President with authority to engage in a military expedition
against a county with which the United States is at peace).
111. See Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170, 178–79 (1804) (prohibiting the President
from construing a statute to give it greater effect even during wartime hostilities because doing so
was acting beyond the authority granted by Congress).
112. Smith, 27 F. Cas. at 1229–30.
113. The Prize Cases, 67 U.S. (2 Black) 635, 691–92 (1863).
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affairs. 114 In Curtiss-Wright, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
congressional delegation of lawmaking authority to the President.115 The
greatest legacy of the case, however, is not its holding, but Justice
Sutherland’s extraordinary discussion of the origin and nature of
presidential power in foreign affairs.116
Writing for the majority, Justice Sutherland first argued that the source
of the President’s power in foreign affairs originates outside the
Constitution. 117 In domestic affairs, he explained, the federal government
may only exercise those powers specifically enumerated in the
Constitution. 118 The Founders vested these express grants of constitutional
power in the federal government by carving them from powers possessed
by the states. 119 The power to conduct foreign affairs, however, was never
possessed by the states, and, therefore, could not have been stripped from
the states and vested in the federal government. 120 The power instead
passed directly from the British Crown to the federal government, vesting it
with the power to conduct foreign affairs independent of any affirmative
grant of power by the Constitution. 121
Justice Sutherland used this distinction to argue that the President’s
power in foreign affairs was inherent and plenary. 122 He quoted a speech by
then-Congressman John Marshall, given on the floor of the House of
Representatives in 1800, 123 to support his conclusion that the President is
not only the “sole representative” of the nation, 124 but also the “sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations.”125 He
continued, arguing that there is little room for Congress to participate in
foreign affairs:
In this vast external realm, with its important, complicated,
delicate and manifold problems, the President alone has the
power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation. He
makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; but he
alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate cannot
intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.126
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
Id. at 329.
Id. at 315–22.
Id. at 316.
Id. at 315–16.
Id. at 316.
Id.
Id. at 318.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 319 (quoting 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800)).
Id.
Id. at 320.
Id. at 319.
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Ultimately, Justice Sutherland concluded that when a President acts
pursuant to a congressional delegation of authority, and that action
implicates foreign relations, the Court should not strictly construe
congressional delegations of power. 127
Despite the Court acknowledging that these passages are dicta, 128
Justice Sutherland’s conception of presidential power secured so strong a
foothold in separation of powers jurisprudence that courts began to
regularly rely on Curtiss-Wright in cases involving questions of presidential
power. 129 In 1942, Justice Stone quoted Curtiss-Wright in United States v.
Pink 130 to argue that the President has broad authority to put policies in
place that give effect to a recognition decision because he is the “sole organ
of the federal government in the field of international relations.”131 CurtissWright also paved the way for the Court to uphold many instances of
unilateral presidential action during World War II. 132
Sixteen years after Curtiss-Wright, the Court decided Youngstown,
marking yet another drastic shift in how it viewed separation of powers in

127. Id. at 322.
128. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–36 n.2 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
129. See, e.g., Regan v. Wald, 468 U.S. 222, 243 (1984) (sustaining the President’s decision to
restrict travel to Cuba due to “traditional deference to executive judgment” in foreign affairs);
Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293–94 (1981) (stating that it is “generally accepted” that foreign
policy is the domain of the President); Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 1000 n.1 (1979)
(Powell, J., concurring) (“The Court has recognized that, in the area of foreign policy, Congress
may leave the President with wide discretion.”); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 556–57
(1975) (arguing that a congressional delegation of power should be not be construed stringently
when the President “possesses independent authority over the subject matter”); N.Y. Times v.
United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring) (explaining that the President’s
power in foreign affairs is “largely unchecked” by other branches); Zemel v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17
(1965) (arguing that when Congress delegates the President authority in foreign affairs, it must
“paint with a brush broader than that it customarily wields in domestic areas”); Johnson v.
Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 789 (1950) (explaining that the President is exclusively responsible for
the conduct of foreign affairs); Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950) (emphasizing
that the right to exclude aliens “stems not alone from legislative power but is inherent in the
executive power to control the foreign affairs of the nation” (citing Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. 304;
then citing Fing You Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 713 (1893))); Chicago & Southern Air
Lines v. Waterman Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (declining to review an executive order
because the President is the Nation’s “organ for foreign affairs”).
130. 315 U.S. 203 (1942).
131. Id. at 229 (quoting Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320).
132. See, e.g., Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 41–42 (1942) (citing Curtiss-Wright to support
deference to an executive action pursuant to congressional delegation); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81, 85 (1943) (upholding an executive order authorizing “every possible
protection” against spies and saboteurs); Ex Parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 298 (1944)
(“Broad powers frequently granted to the President or other executive officers by Congress so that
they may deal with the exigencies of wartime problems have been sustained.”); Korematsu v.
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 218–19 (1944) (relying on Hirabayashi to again uphold the executive
order authorizing “every possible protection” against spies and saboteurs).
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foreign affairs. 133 In Youngstown, President Truman issued an executive
order seizing control of most of the steel mills in the United States, which
he argued was constitutional pursuant to his “inherent power” as
president. 134 The Court struck down the order, rejecting the general trend
of cases following Curtiss-Wright. 135 Similar to Curtiss-Wright, the merits
of Youngstown have faded into history. What remains, however, is Justice
Jackson’s scheme of presidential power. 136
In a concurring opinion, Justice Jackson set forth three categories of
presidential power based on their “disjunction or conjunction with those of
Congress.” 137 The first category applies where the President acts pursuant
to the express or implied authorization of Congress; in these instances, his
authority is at its maximum. 138 The second category refers to a
constitutional “zone of twilight,” where the President acts in absence of
either a congressional grant or denial of authority. 139 Under these
circumstances, the President can rely only on his own powers. 140 The final
category refers to when the President takes measures incompatible with the
expressed or implied will of Congress.141 Here, the President’s power is “at
its lowest ebb,” and he can rely only on his powers minus Congress’s power
over the matter. 142
Of particular relevance to Zivotofsky is Jackson’s final category,
referred to as the “Third Category” or a “lowest ebb case.” For this brand
of conflict, Jackson anticipated an exception: “Courts can sustain exclusive
Presidential control in such a case only by disabling the Congress from
acting upon the subject. Presidential claim to a power at once so conclusive
and preclusive must be scrutinized with caution, for what is at stake is the
equilibrium established by our constitutional system.” 143
Justice Jackson relegated Curtiss-Wright to a footnote 144 and flatly
rejected the concept of inherent powers.145 In the years since Youngstown,
133. Youngstown, 343 U.S. 579.
134. Id. at 582, 583–84, 589.
135. Despite imminent labor strikes that would shut down American steel mills and
discontinue the production of steel during the Korean War, the Court held that President Truman
did not have statutory or constitutional authority to seize the steel mills. Id. at 588–89. In so
holding, the Youngstown majority expressly rejected President Truman’s assertion of “inherent
power” to issue the executive order. Id.
136. Id. at 634–55 (Jackson, J., concurring).
137. Id. at 635.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 637.
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Id.
143. Id. at 637–38 (footnote omitted).
144. Id. at 635–36 n.2.
145. Id. at 652.
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courts have relied on Justice Jackson’s scheme of power between the
political branches to determine the scope of presidential power in foreign
affairs.
C. The Court Views the President’s Power over Passport Regulation
as Dependent on Congressional Delegation
A passport is “a travel document . . . issued under the authority of the
Secretary of State attesting to the identity and nationality of the bearer,”146
and is proof of United States citizenship. 147 Federal law prohibits a person
from entering or exiting the United States without a passport,148 though this
law is subject to several exceptions. 149
In the first fifty years after the Constitution was ratified, Congress
passed several laws regulating passports. 150 During that time, however, the
federal government did not have exclusive control over all passports, and
officials at all levels of local, state, and federal government issued various
types of documents certifying citizenship or introducing foreign officials to
other sovereign states. 151 Congress sought to establish a uniform passport
policy in 1856 when it enacted a general passport statute, broadly
authorizing the Secretary of State and “no other person” to grant and issue
passports. 152 This statute eventually became the Passport Act of 1926, 153
146. 22 C.F.R. § 51.1 (2015).
147. 22 U.S.C. § 2705 (2012) (A passport “shall have the same force and effect as proof of
United States citizenship as certificates of naturalization.”); see also Magnuson v. Baker, 911 F.2d
330, 334 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that 22 U.S.C. § 2705 was “a clear instruction from Congress to
treat passports in the same manner as certificates of citizenship or certificates of naturalization in
all respects”). But see United States v. Moreno, 727 F.3d 255, 261 (3d Cir. 2013) (holding that a
passport only serves as conclusive proof of U.S. citizenship if the bearer was a U.S. citizen at the
time of issuance).
148. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (2012); see also Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 293 (1981) (citing 8 U.S.C.
§ 1185).
149. 22 C.F.R. § 53.2(b) (2015). Among several enumerated exceptions, the State Department
allows members of the U.S. Armed Forces to enter the United States when carrying a military
identification card, and has discretion to waive the passport requirement due to unforeseen
emergency or humanitarian reasons. Id. §§ 53.2(b)(1), (9), (10).
150. Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 122 (1958) (listing passport statutes from the early
nineteenth century); see also Act of Feb. 4, 1815, § 10, 3 Stat. 195, 199–200 (prohibiting a citizen
from crossing into enemy territory without a passport).
151. Kent, 357 U.S. at 123.
152. Act of Aug. 18, 1856, ch. 127, § 23, 11 Stat. 52, 60–61 (to regulate the diplomatic and
consular systems of the United States). The Supreme Court has discussed the possibility that
Congress’s enactment of broad passport legislation delegating substantial discretion to the
Secretary of State reflects the originalist understanding that passport regulation was primarily the
domain of the Secretary of State. See Agee, 453 U.S. at 293 (explaining that it was the “common
perception” that the President had sole discretion over issuing passports during the ratification
era); Urtetiqui v. D’Arcy, 34 U.S. (9 Pet.) 692, 699 (1835) (explaining that the requirements for
applying for a passport are “entirely discretionary” with the Secretary of State). But see Kent, 357
U.S. at 128–29 (explaining that Congress did not allow the Secretary of State “unbridled
discretion” over passport regulations).
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which remains the federal government’s general passport statute.154 The
Passport Act delegates broad authority to the Secretary of State to “grant
and issue” passports “under such rules as the President shall designate.” 155
Pursuant to this delegation of authority, the Secretary of State has discretion
over determining eligibility, issuing regulations pertaining to denial or
revocation, and establishing procedures for review of denials and
revocations, among other aspects of passport regulation. 156 Despite this
delegation of authority, Congress still exercises its power to enact
legislation affecting different aspects of passport regulation.157
Courts have faced challenges to the validity of passport regulations,
but the cases focus on the extent to which the Secretary of State may
exercise discretion over passport regulation. 158 The Supreme Court has
determined that the range of the Secretary’s discretion depends on the
congressional delegation of power. 159 Where the delegation is not express,
the Court will look to congressional acquiescence and prior administrative
practice to determine the Secretary of State’s authority over passports. 160
Curiously, courts have not directly addressed Congress’s constitutional
authority to enact passport legislation. 161 The Supreme Court, in cases
153. Act of July 3, 1926, Pub. L. No. 493, 44 Stat., Part I, 887 (regulating the issuance and
validity of passports).
154. 22 U.S.C. § 211a (2012).
155. Id.
156. See generally 22 C.F.R. § 51.1–51.74 (2015) (passport regulations). The State
Department elaborates on these regulations in its Foreign Affairs Manual. U.S. DEP’T. OF STATE,
7 FAM § 1300 (2015), https://fam.state.gov/Fam/FAM.aspx?ID=07FAM.
157. 8 U.S.C. § 1504 (2012) (cancellation of U.S. passports and consular reports of birth); 18
U.S.C. § 1542 (2012) (false statement in application and use of passport); 18 U.S.C. § 1543
(2012) (forgery or false use of passport); 18 U.S.C. § 1544 (2012) (misuse of passport); 22 U.S.C.
§ 212a (2012) (restriction of passports for sex tourism); 22 U.S.C. § 2714 (2012) (denial of
passports to certain convicted drug traffickers); 42 U.S.C. § 652(k) (2012) (denial of passports for
nonpayment of child support).
158. See infra notes 159–160 and accompanying text.
159. See, e.g., Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 290–91 (1981) (holding that the Passport Act of
1926 authorizes the President to revoke a passport based on concerns for national security); Zemel
v. Rusk, 381 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1965) (holding that the Secretary of State had statutory authority to
impose area travel restrictions); Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116, 130 (1958) (holding that the
Passport Act of 1926 did not delegate authority to the Secretary of State to deny passports based
on political affiliation).
160. Agee, 453 U.S. at 296–97 (explaining that Congress never attempted to repudiate the
Secretary of State’s revocations of passports for national security concerns); Zemel, 381 U.S. at
17–18 (reasoning that the Secretary of State had imposed area restrictions on many occasions
without protest from Congress); Kent, 357 U.S. at 128 (explaining that the Secretary of State’s
regulation regarding denial of a passport was invalid because it was based on grounds not
contemplated by the Passport Act of 1926); see also Lynd v. Rusk, 389 F.2d 940, 944 (D.C. Cir.
1967) (explaining that Kent and Zemel “make plain” that the Passport Act of 1926 “is broader than
the authority it confers”).
161. Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964), dealt with the constitutionality of a
statute that prohibited a member of the Communist party from applying for or using a passport.
Id. at 502. The Court ultimately found the statute unconstitutional, but not because Congress did
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dealing with passport legislation, has assumed the Passport Act is
constitutional and, consequently, Congress’s authority to enact passport
legislation. 162
D. Congress Has Broad Authority to Regulate Conduct Abroad Under
the Foreign Commerce Clause
The Constitution provides, “[t]he Congress shall have the Power . . .
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”163 Referred to as the Foreign
Commerce Clause, this provision does not have as robust a body of case
law as the Interstate Commerce Clause. 164 It is generally agreed, however,
that the Foreign Commerce Clause is extremely broad, conferring exclusive
and plenary authority on Congress to regulate foreign commerce with
foreign nations. 165 A handful of cases even argue that the scope of the
Foreign Commerce Clause is greater than that of the Interstate Commerce
Clause because Congress is not limited by federalism or state sovereignty
concerns. 166
The term “commerce” encompasses to “travel, trade, traffic,
commerce, transportation, or communication . . . between any foreign
country . . . and any State.” 167 Like its interstate analogue, the Foreign
Commerce Clause comprehends the regulation of channels and
instrumentalities of foreign commerce. 168 Its reach extends to goods and

not have the authority to enact it. Id. at 514, 517; see also Zemel, 381 U.S. at 6 (attacking the
validity of the Passport Acts of 1926 and 1952 on the grounds that the statutes were unlawful
delegations of lawmaking power to the Executive).
162. Zemel, 381 U.S. at 7–9 (discussing the legislative history of the Passport Act of 1926);
Kent, 357 U.S. at 122–25 (detailing congressionally enacted passport statutes at length without
questioning the constitutionality of their enactment).
163. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
164. United States v. Clark, 435 F.3d 1100, 1102 (9th Cir. 2006) (stating that the scope of the
Foreign Commerce Clause “has yet to be subjected to judicial scrutiny”).
165. See California Bankers Ass’n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 59 (1974) (explaining that
Congress’s plenary authority to regulate foreign commerce is “well established”); Bd. of Trustees
of Univ. of Illinois v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 56 (1933) (foreign commerce power is
“exclusive and plenary”); Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 193 (1824) (stating that
Congress’s Commerce Power includes “every species of commercial intercourse between the
United States and foreign nations”).
166. E.g., Clark, 435 F.3d at 1103 (arguing that evidence exists that the Founders intended
the scope of the foreign commerce power to be greater than the interstate commerce power)
(citing Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles Cty., 441 U.S. 434, 448 (1979))). But see Pittsburgh & S.
Coal Co. v. Bates, 156 U.S. 577, 587 (1895) (“The power to regulate commerce among the several
States was granted to Congress in terms as absolute as is the power to regulate commerce with
foreign nations.”).
167. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 263 (1964).
168. Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 444 (instrumentalities); Chicago & Southern Air Lines, 333 U.S.
103, 104–05 (1948) (channels); Henderson v. Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270 (1875)
(channels); Gibbons, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 72 (channels). United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d
1218 (11th Cir. 2005), defines channels of commerce as the “transportation routes through which
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services, 169 international travel by people,170 and conduct in foreign
countries that affects United States interests.171
III. THE COURT’S REASONING
In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the United States Supreme Court affirmed the
decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit, holding that Section 214(d) of the Foreign Relations Authorization
Act was unconstitutional. 172 The Court first concluded that the text and
structure of the Constitution imply that the President has the power to
recognize foreign sovereigns. 173 Next, the Court determined that precedent,
historical practice, and functional considerations demonstrate that the
President’s recognition power is exclusive, 174 and that Congress may not
force the President to contradict his own statements regarding
recognition. 175 The Court found that Section 214(d) of the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act forced the President to contradict his statement
of recognition with respect to Jerusalem. 176 As a result, Section 214(d)
infringed on his exclusive recognition power and, therefore, was
unconstitutional. 177
Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, framed the issue in
Zivotofsky as falling in the third category of Justice Jackson’s three-tiered
framework of presidential power. 178 Both parties acknowledged that
because the President was acting in contravention of a statute, his power
was “at its lowest ebb,” and the Court could only sustain it if the power is
both “‘exclusive’ and ‘conclusive’ on the issue.” 179 Within this framework,
the majority first held that the text and the structure of the Constitution
persons and goods move,” and instrumentalities as “the people and things themselves moving in
commerce.” Id. at 1225–26 (citations omitted).
169. United States v. Martinez, 599 F. Supp. 2d 784, 807 n.19, 807–08 (W.D. Tex. 2009)
(child prostitution services).
170. United States ex rel. Turner v. Williams, 194 U.S. 279, 290 (1904); Clark, 435 F.3d. at
1114 (holding that the defendant traveled in foreign commerce by traveling from the United States
to Cambodia).
171. Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 620 (1927); American Banana Co. v. United Fruit
Co., 213 U.S. 347, 355–56 (1909); see also 18 U.S.C. § 1201(a) (2012) (prohibiting the
kidnapping of any person and transportation of that person in foreign commerce); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2423 (2012) (prohibiting travel in foreign commerce for the purpose of committing illicit sexual
conduct abroad).
172. 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2095 (2015).
173. Id. at 2086.
174. Id. at 2094.
175. Id. at 2095.
176. Id. at 2094.
177. Id. at 2096.
178. Id. at 2083.
179. Id. at 2084 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
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imply that the President has the power to formally recognize foreign
sovereigns. 180 Specifically, the majority determined that the text and
structure of the Reception Clause, the Treaty Clause, and the Appointment
Clause imply that the President has a recognition power. 181 The Reception
Clause directs that the President “shall receive Ambassadors and other
public Ministers.” 182 When the Constitution was ratified, the Court argued,
it was commonly understood that receiving an ambassador was a de facto
act of recognition. 183 Additionally, as a matter of constitutional structure,
the President’s power over treaties and the appointment of public officials
demonstrates that the President can engage in activities that may lead to
recognition, such as nominating ambassadors and negotiating treaties.184 In
contrast, Congress has no constitutional power to initiate diplomatic
relations with a foreign government. 185
The Zivotofsky Court next held that the President has the exclusive
recognition power—including the power both to effect recognition and
determine recognition policy. 186 The Court based this conclusion, first, on
the fact that the President can effect recognition unilaterally in several
different ways, while Congress cannot. 187 Second, the Court reasoned that
functional considerations suggest that the recognition power is exclusively
vested in the President.188 Specifically, the United States must only have
one policy with respect to whether a given government is legitimate
because foreign countries need to know their status before entering into
diplomatic relations or commerce with the United States.189 Additionally,
the Court argued, “Recognition is a topic on which the Nation must
‘speak . . . with one voice.’” 190 That voice, the Court explained, must be the
President’s because his is the only branch that has the “characteristic of
unity at all times.” 191 Additionally, the President can engage in “the
180. Id. at 2085. Formal recognition is “formal acknowledgment that the entity possesses the
qualifications for statehood.” RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 203 cmt. a (1987). The formal acknowledgment may be written, oral, or
implied by concluding a treaty or receiving ambassadors. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2084.
181. Id. at 2085.
182. Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3).
183. Id. at 2085. The majority noted that although the Reception Clause “received little
attention at the Constitutional Convention,” scholars at that time wrote that “receiving an
ambassador was tantamount to recognizing the sovereignty of the sending state.” Id. (citing
EMMERICH DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF NATIONS § 78 (Philadelphia, T. & J.W. Johnson, 1852)).
184. Id. at 2085–86.
185. Id. at 2086.
186. Id. at 2094.
187. Id. at 2085–86 (explaining that the President may unilaterally effect recognition by
dispatching or receiving an ambassador or directly engaging in diplomacy with a foreign nation).
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 2086 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)).
191. Id.
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delicate and often secret diplomatic contacts that may lead to a decision on
recognition,” and can more easily take “decisive, unequivocal action
necessary to recognize other states.” 192
Third, the Court argued that precedent supports its conclusion that the
President’s recognition power is exclusive. 193 The Court began by
acknowledging that virtually no binding legal precedent exists on the
specific issue presented in Zivotofsky. 194 Although it has resolved disputes
over the recognition power between the federal government and the states,
and the judiciary and the political branches, the Court has never dealt with a
conflict between the President and Congress. 195 The Court also noted,
“some isolated statements in those cases lend support to the position that
Congress has a role in the recognition process.” 196 Notwithstanding, the
Court argued that Supreme Court precedent supports the conclusion that it
is exclusive. 197 The Court pointed to United States v. Pink, 198 for example,
which stated that the President has authority “to determine the policy which
is to govern the question of recognition.” 199 The Court cited even stronger
language in Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino: 200 “[p]olitical
recognition is exclusively a function of the Executive.” 201 Conceding that
the cases went both ways, the Court argued Banco Nacional further
supported the conclusion that the President’s recognition power is
exclusive. 202
Fourth, the Court explained that since the ratification era, the President
has unilaterally exercised the recognition power on many occasions and, for
the most part, Congress has acquiesced.203 President Washington, the Court
highlighted, unilaterally recognized the French revolutionary government in
1793 by receiving a French ambassador representing the new
government. 204 President Washington did not consult with Congress and

192. Id.
193. Id. at 2091.
194. Id. at 2088.
195. Id. (citing United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (federal government and the states);
then citing Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964) (federal government and
the judiciary)).
196. Id. at 2088.
197. Id.; see supra Part II.A.
198. 315 U.S. 230.
199. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2088 (quoting Pink, 315 U.S. at 229).
200. 376 U.S. 398.
201. Id. at 2089 (quoting Banco Nacional de Cuba, 376 U.S. at 410). The Court also relied on
National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, which held that “[t]he status of the
Republic of China in our courts is a matter for determination by the Executive and is outside the
competence of this Court.” 348 U.S. 356, 358 (1955).
202. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2088.
203. Id. at 2091.
204. Id. at 2091–92.
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Congress did not protest the reception of the ambassador. 205 Similarly,
when President Carter recognized the People’s Republic of China and
derecognized the Republic of China, Congress did not challenge the
President’s exclusive authority to effect recognition. 206 On occasion, the
Court conceded, Congress and the President have acted together to
recognize foreign sovereignties. 207 The Court concluded, however, that for
most of the twentieth century the President recognized new governments
without any “serious opposition” 208 from Congress, and there has been little
debate that the power is exclusively vested in the President.209
Next, the Court held that Congress may not force the President to
contradict an earlier statement on recognition.210 The Court reasoned that,
as a “matter of both common sense and necessity,” 211 the President’s
exclusive recognition power includes not only the initial, formal
recognition, but also subsequent statements by him and his agents on
recognition. 212 If Congress could override the President’s recognition
determination, the Court reasoned, the recognition power would be
meaningless. 213 As such, the Court held that Congress may not enact a law
that forces the President to contradict an act of recognition.214
The Zivotofsky Court emphasized that the President has no greater
authority to act in foreign affairs than he does on domestic issues.215 The
Court explained that although the President has a unique role in
communicating with foreign governments, he is bound by laws that
Congress enacts, which ensures that “the democratic will of the people is
observed and respected in foreign affairs as in the domestic realm.” 216 In
accordance with this theory, the majority declined to adopt the
Government’s argument that Curtiss-Wright grants the President “broad,
205. Id. at 2092.
206. Id. at 2094.
207. Id. at 2091. The Court cited the recognition of the Republic of Texas in 1835, Liberia
and Haiti in 1861, and the revolutionary government of Cuba in 1898 as examples where the
President collaborated with Congress on acts of recognition. Id. at 2092–93.
208. Id. at 2093 (quoting Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power
Exclusive?, 86 TEMP. L. REV. 1, 41 (2013).
209. Id. at 2093–94.
210. Id. at 2095.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 2094–95.
213. Id.
214. Id. Sensing the breadth of its holding, the Court was careful to specify that although
Congress is disabled from acting on the subject of recognition, the subject is “quite narrow”; it is
limited only to formal recognition determinations. Id.; see supra note 180.
215. Id. at 2090 (“But whether the realm is foreign or domestic, it is still the Legislative
Branch, not the Executive Branch, that makes the law.”).
216. Id. at 2088. Congress’s role in foreign affairs, the Court explained, is essential because it
is a check on presidential power. Id. at 2090. The Court stated, “The Executive is not free from
the ordinary controls and checks of Congress merely because foreign affairs are at issue.” Id.

886

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:865

undefined powers over foreign affairs.” 217 The Court also repeatedly
stressed Congress’s essential role in formulating policy and enacting
legislation in foreign affairs. 218 Moreover, the Court noted, ruling that the
President has the exclusive recognition power does not leave the President
with uncheckable power; if Congress disagrees with an act of recognition
by the President, Congress may refuse to dispatch an ambassador or engage
in commerce with that nation.219 Congress may not, however, force the
President to contradict an earlier statement on recognition.220
Finally, the Zivotofsky Court held that Section 214(d)
unconstitutionally infringed on the President’s exclusive recognition
power. 221 The provision, as written, entitles children born in Jerusalem to a
U.S. passport stating that they were born in “Israel.” 222 According to the
President and longstanding U.S. policy, however, children born in
Jerusalem are not born in Israel. 223 In this sense, the provision “directly
contradicts” the President’s decision to withhold recognition of Jerusalem
as belonging to any sovereign. 224 For this reason, the Zivotofsky Court
found Section 214(d) is unconstitutional, and it affirmed the decision of the
Court of Appeals. 225
Justice Breyer joined the majority, but filed a brief concurring opinion
arguing that he believed the case presented a political question. 226 Justice
Thomas filed an opinion concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part. 227 Justice Thomas agreed that Section 214(d) was unconstitutional,
but disagreed with the Court’s reasoning. 228 Sidestepping recognition
217. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2089. The Court added that, first, Curtiss-Wright dealt with
whether a congressional delegation of power to the President was constitutional, and the broadsweeping descriptions of unbounded power were dicta. Id. at 2090. Second, any pronouncement
of presidential authority in foreign affairs beyond the recognition power would be unnecessary to
resolve the issue in Zivotofsky. Id. at 2089.
218. Id. at 2087 (explaining that Congress has “substantial authority regarding many of the
policy determinations that precede and follow the act of recognition itself”); id. at 2088
(“Congress has an important role in other aspects of foreign policy.”); id. at 2090 (“[I]t is essential
that the congressional role in foreign affairs be understood and respected.”).
219. Id. at 2087.
220. Id. at 2095.
221. Id.
222. Id. at 2094.
223. Id.
224. Id.
225. Id. at 2096.
226. Id. (Breyer, J., concurring). Justice Breyer filed a dissenting opinion in the 2012
Zivotofsky case, arguing that the case presented a political question. Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 132 S.
Ct. 1421, 1437 (2012) (Breyer, J., dissenting). He was precluded from doing so again because
that case, which held that Zivotofsky did not constitute a political question was now binding
precedent. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citing Zivotofsky, 132 S. Ct. at
1437 (Breyer, J., dissenting)).
227. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (Thomas, J., concurring).
228. Id. at 2097.
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altogether, he argued that as a passport law, Section 214(d) fell within the
President’s “residual” foreign affairs power through Article II’s Vesting
Clause. 229 In support of his argument, Justice Thomas pointed to historical
evidence that the President has consistently controlled the issuance of
passports since the ratification era.230 When Congress has enacted passport
legislation, he argued, the laws have always been narrow in scope and
acknowledged broad executive discretion on the subject.231 Justice Thomas
concluded that despite Zivotofsky’s arguments to the contrary, Congress
had no authority to enact Section 214(d) pursuant to its foreign commerce
or naturalization powers, or through the Necessary and Proper Clause.232
Justice Thomas further argued that Section 214(d) did not implicate
recognition because, essentially, Israel has already been recognized by the
United States. 233 The question of sovereignty over Jerusalem, in contrast, is
a question of potential change to Israel’s territory. 234 He explained,
“[l]isting a Jerusalem-born citizen’s place of birth as ‘Israel’ cannot amount
to recognition because the United States already recognizes Israel as an
international person.” 235 In essence, Justice Thomas argued, the majority
relied on a distorted definition of “recognition.”236
Justice Scalia, joined by Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, filed a
dissenting opinion. Justice Scalia first argued that Congress had authority
to enact Section 214(d) pursuant to its powers over naturalization.237
Congress’s naturalization power, he argued, enables it to “furnish the
people it makes citizens with papers verifying their citizenship.”238 Next,
Justice Scalia acknowledged that the Constitution grants the President
power over recognition, but disputed that it was exclusive. 239 Even if it did,
Justice Scalia argued, Section 214(d) did not implicate recognition.240 The

229. Id. at 2101. Justice Thomas argued that certain powers are expressly enumerated to
either or both political branches, and all “residual” foreign powers are vested in the President
through Article II’s Vesting Clause. Id.
230. Id. at 2101–02.
231. Id. at 2103.
232. Id. at 2104. Justice Thomas would have held, however, that Section 214(d) was
constitutional with respect to the Consular Report of Birth Abroad. Id. at 2111. While the
statute’s application to passports was unconstitutional because it fell under the President’s residual
foreign affairs powers, Congress has authority over Consular Reports of Birth Abroad through its
powers over naturalization. Id.
233. Id. at 2112.
234. Id.
235. Id.
236. Id. at 2112–13.
237. Id. at 2117 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2118.
240. Id.
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statute does not “require the Secretary to make a formal declaration about
Israel’s sovereignty over Jerusalem,” and thus should have been upheld.241
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, filed a separate
dissenting opinion to highlight the majority’s “error on a basic question of
separation of powers.” 242 Even if Section 214(d) implicated the recognition
power, Chief Justice Roberts argued the President failed to demonstrate that
his power is “so conclusive and preclusive” that it “disabl[es] the Congress
from acting on the subject.” 243 Turning first to the text, Chief Justice
Roberts explained that the majority’s reliance on the Reception Clause is
weak because receiving ambassadors is a duty, not a power. 244
Additionally, the President’s other enumerated foreign powers are shared
with Congress, which undermines the conclusion that the President’s
recognition power is exclusive. 245 Chief Justice Roberts next argued that
the legal precedents consist only of “conflicting dicta,” and history points in
both directions. 246 And, while congressional acquiescence may provide
guidance when the President acts without congressional authorization, here,
the President acted contrary to a duly enacted statute.247 Ultimately, Chief
Justice Roberts concluded that Section 214(d) did not warrant allowing the
President to contravene an act of Congress in the field of foreign affairs for
the first time in history. 248
IV. ANALYSIS
In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Court held that the President had the
exclusive power to determine recognition policy and effect recognition, and
Congress could not force the President to contradict acts or statements of
formal recognition.249 The Court further held that Section 214(d), although
not a formal act of recognition, forced the President to contradict a formal
statement of recognition. 250
For these reasons, the statute was
unconstitutional.
In addition to addressing the merits of Zivotofsky’s claims, the Court
corrected two significant flaws promulgated by Justice Sutherland in United
States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp. 251 In doing so, the Court signaled a
241. Id.
242. Id. at 2113 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
243. Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952)
(Jackson, J., concurring)).
244. Id. at 2113.
245. Id. at 2114.
246. Id.
247. Id.
248. Id. at 2116.
249. Id. at 2096 (majority opinion).
250. See infra Part IV.A.
251. See infra Part IV.A.
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shift in the theoretical framework through which it analyzes foreign affairs
cases implicating separation of powers.252 Within this framework, the
Court correctly held that the President has exclusive recognition power. 253
The President’s exclusive power to effect recognition fits uncontroversially
under his broader authority as sole organ of communication with foreign
governments. 254 Regarding the President’s power to determine recognition
policy, the Court reached the correct conclusion but did not conduct a
sufficiently exacting analysis. 255 The Court should have concluded that the
President has exclusive power to determine recognition policy through his
residual foreign affairs power derived from the Vesting Clause of Article
II. 256
Although it correctly concluded that the President has exclusive power
to effect recognition, the Court erred in holding that Section 214(d) was
unconstitutional.257 First, in holding that Congress may not force the
President to contradict his statements on recognition, the Court erroneously
articulated a far-reaching rule that encompasses otherwise constitutionally
enacted legislation.258 This rule too greatly infringes on Congress’s
lawmaking power, and represented an attempt to strike down legislation
that compromised the United States’ neutral policy towards Jerusalem at the
cost of our system of separation of powers. 259 Instead, the Court should
have limited the scope of infringement only to other formal acts of
recognition. 260 Applying this rule, Section 214(d) would not have infringed
on the President’s exclusive recognition power.261 Finally, the Court should
have concluded that Section 214(d) is constitutional pursuant to Congress’s
authority under the Foreign Commerce Clause. 262
A. The Court Properly Rejected Curtiss-Wright’s Theory of Inherent
Power and Set Forth a Balanced Theory of Division of Powers
Between Congress and the President in Foreign Affairs
In Zivotofsky, the Court seized an opportunity to reject CurtissWright’s flawed theory of inherent power. On its face, the text of the
opinion appears to do nothing more than distinguish Curtiss-Wright on its

252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.
262.

See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.B.
See infra Part IV.D.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.C.
See infra Part IV.D.
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facts. 263 The Court went out of its way, however, to affirmatively dismiss
Curtiss-Wright’s dangerous theory of inherent power and correct Justice
Sutherland’s misinterpretation of Chief Justice John Marshall’s sole organ
theory. The Court did this by stressing that the President’s power is no
greater in foreign affairs than in domestic, 264 and that Congress has an
important role in formulating and implementing foreign policy. 265
Additionally, it correctly cited Chief Justice John Marshall’s “sole organ”
speech as acknowledging the President’s “unique role in communicating
with foreign governments” and not as a source of inherent power.266 These
aspects of the Zivotofsky opinion show an attempt by the Court to shift the
theoretical framework through which it decides foreign affairs cases to a
more balanced division of power between Congress and the President.
Curtiss-Wright’s first great flaw is Justice Sutherland’s argument that
the President’s inherent power to conduct foreign affairs derives from a
source outside the Constitution.267 This theory is incorrect for two reasons.
First, commentators have refuted Justice Sutherland’s theory that power
over foreign affairs passed directly from the British Crown to the federal
government and not the states. 268 Soon after declaring independence, in
fact, Congress affirmatively allocated British “sovereignty” to the states—
not the federal government—and specified that each state retained every
power not expressly delegated to the central government. 269 Moreover, in
the years between declaring independence and ratifying the Constitution,
the states were active in foreign affairs.270 Individual states engaged in
foreign trade, signed treaties, and sought to borrow money from other
countries. 271 In addition to this historical evidence, Professor Louis Henkin
points out that the text of both the Articles of Confederation and the
Constitution deny states key foreign affairs powers. 272 If the states never
263. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015) (distinguishing Curtiss-Wright
because it involved the constitutionality of a congressional delegation of power, which was
irrelevant to Zivotofsky).
264. Id. at 2090; see supra note 215.
265. See supra note 218.
266. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2090.
267. See supra notes 117–121 and accompanying text.
268. See infra notes 269–271.
269. Charles A. Lofgren, United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corporation: An Historical
Reassessment, 83 YALE L.J. 1, 16 (1973). Professor Lofgren argues, “[f]or Sutherland . . . another
government was evidently the only possible source for these powers of sovereignty.” Id. at 14.
270. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT
107–08 (6th rev. ed. 2014).
271. David M. Levitan, The Foreign Relations Power: An Analysis of Mr. Justice Sutherland’s
Theory, 55 YALE L.J. 467, 486 (1946).
272. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Article I, § 10 prohibits the states from entering into treaties,
entering into agreements with foreign countries, taxing imported goods, and keeping troops or
ships during a time of peace. Id.; see also LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE U.S.
CONSTITUTION 151–52 (2nd ed. 1996) (discussing the Constitution’s express denial and implicit
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had the power to participate in foreign affairs, these limitations would be
redundant. 273
The second reason that Justice Sutherland’s inherent powers theory is
incorrect is because, simply, the theory is inconsistent with the most
fundamental principle of United States government: all authority derives
from the Constitution’s enumerated powers, and implied powers
“reasonably drawn” from enumerated powers. 274 Inherent power, in
contrast, is not drawn from the Constitution, and is thus not subject to its
carefully placed limitations. 275 A fundamental purpose of the Constitution,
drafted when monarchical prerogative and tyranny were recent memories, is
to limit the abuse of government power. 276 The Constitution does this by
containing all of its powers within its text, which consists of express or
implied grants of power stripped from the states and the people of the
United States and vested in the federal government. 277 Claims of power not
subject to constitutional limitations are more akin to tyranny than a
democratic system of government.
Curtiss-Wright’s second great flaw is Justice Sutherland’s skewed
interpretation of John Marshall’s sole organ theory. 278 On March 7, 1800,
then-Congressman John Marshall argued on the floor of the House of
Representatives that the President was the “sole organ of the nation in its
external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”279
Commentators nearly unanimously agree that John Marshall was describing
the President as the sole organ for communication with foreign
limitations on state involvement in foreign affairs); MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION’S
TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 33 (2007) (arguing that the Articles of Confederation do not suggest
an inherent foreign affairs power).
273. RAMSEY, supra note 272, at 21. Professor Ramsey also discusses The Federalist as an
example of ratification era commentary that framed foreign affairs in terms of delegated powers,
not inherent powers. Id. at 24.
274. FISHER, supra note 270, at 18; HENKIN, supra note 272, at 25. That implied powers are
necessary for the proper functioning of government traces back to McCulloch v. Maryland. 17
U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819). In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall stated that a constitution
that enumerated every power of government “would partake of the prolixity of a legal code.” Id.
Instead, “its great outlines should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor
ingredients which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects themselves.”
Id. (emphasis added).
275. FISHER, supra note 270, at 18.
276. HENKIN, supra note 272, at 27–28.
277. RAMSEY, supra note 272, at 13. Professor Ramsey argues that the Tenth Amendment is
textual evidence that governmental power is either reserved to the states or the people, or
delegated to the federal government. Id. at 18. He quickly points out, however, that this argument
may be insufficient: “Sutherland in effect argued that the Tenth Amendment’s language cannot be
taken literally, because the Constitution’s drafters had a background understanding that foreign
affairs powers could not be delegated (because the states never possessed them) and could not be
reserved (for the same reason).” Id. at 19.
278. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
279. 10 ANNALS OF CONG. 613 (1800).
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governments, not the President’s inherent power to conduct foreign
policy. 280 By manipulating the meaning of John Marshall’s speech,
however, Justice Sutherland concluded that the President was the “sole
organ of the federal government in the field of international relations.” 281
As has already been discussed, this mischaracterization of presidential
power led to a significantly expanded view of this power after CurtissWright. 282
The issue in Zivotofsky did not require that the Court right the wrongs
of Curtiss-Wright. It could have omitted its entire discussion of CurtissWright, excluded its correction of Chief Justice John Marshall’s speech, and
skipped its clarification that the President has no greater power in foreign
affairs than it has in domestic. The Court’s holding, as discussed below,
would still be primarily theoretical. The Court recognized, however, that it
had a chance to correct more than seventy-five years of problematic theory
pervading its foreign affairs jurisprudence. In taking this opportunity, the
Zivotofsky Court appropriately “decline[d] to acknowledge [the] unbounded
power” of Curtiss-Wright, signaling a shift in the theoretical framework for
deciding foreign affairs-separation of powers cases towards a more
balanced division of power between Congress and the President. 283
B. The President Has the Exclusive Recognition Power
Within the foregoing theoretical framework, the Zivotofsky Court
correctly held that the President has the exclusive recognition power. The
Court divided the recognition power into two components: the power to
effect recognition, 284 and the power to determine recognition policy. 285

280. HENKIN, supra note 272, at 41; Louis Fisher, The Law: Presidential Inherent Power: The
“Sole Organ” Doctrine, 37 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 37, March 2007, at 139, 142; Kimberly L.
Fletcher, The Court’s Decisive Hand Shapes the Executive’s Foreign Affairs Policymaking Power,
73 MD. L. REV. 247, 259 (2013); Michael J. Glennon, Two Views of Presidential Foreign Affairs
Power: Little v. Barreme or Curtiss-Wright?, 13 YALE J. INT’L L. 5, 10 (1988). Only four years
after this speech, John Marshall penned Little v. Barreme as Chief Justice, further evidence he did
not intend to convey that the President had inherent power to conduct foreign affairs in his “sole
organ” speech. Glennon, supra note 280. After all, Little held that the President, even during a
time of war, could only exercise power pursuant to an act of Congress. 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 170,
177 (1804).
281. Curtiss-Wright, 299 U.S. at 320. Professor Fisher points out a logical misstep between
using Justice Sutherland’s argument, and he concludes that the President’s power in foreign affairs
is exclusive: “Even if the power of external sovereignty had somehow passed intact from the
Crown to the ‘United States,’ the Constitution divides that power between Congress and the
President.” FISHER, supra note 270, at 108.
282. See supra notes 129 & 132 and accompanying text.
283. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2089 (2015).
284. Id. at 2094.
285. See id. at 2090 (“[J]udicial precedent and historical practice teach that it is for the
President alone to make the specific decision of what foreign power he will recognize as
legitimate.”).
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Regarding the President’s power to effect recognition, or “announce”
recognition policy, the Court’s dispositive reasoning was that the United
States must speak with “one voice” on issues of recognition, and that voice
must be the President’s. 286 This reasoning has its theoretical roots in the
widely accepted proposition that it is the sole domain of the President to
communicate with foreign nations.287 The Court reached the correct
conclusion on this aspect of the holding because the power to effect
recognition fits neatly within the President’s role as sole organ of
communication with other governments.
Regarding the President’s power to determine recognition policy, the
Court reached the correct conclusion but failed to subject the issue to a
sufficiently demanding inquiry. The extent to which the President may
unilaterally determine foreign policy strikes at the heart of an ongoing and
unresolved debate over separation of powers in foreign affairs.288 When the
Court allocates policymaking power to one political branch over the other,
it must do so carefully. For its part, the Court correctly inferred from the
President’s longstanding practice of unilaterally determining recognition
policy that he has that exclusive power—but this reasoning was not enough.
The President does, however, have the exclusive power to determine
recognition policy because it falls within his “residual foreign affairs
power” under Article II’s Vesting Clause.
For most of United States history, courts and commentators have
viewed the President as the sole organ of communication with foreign
nations. 289 Professor Louis Henkin argued that this power is to be inferred
from the President’s control over the “foreign affairs apparatus.”290 Article
II, for example, provides that the President shall appoint “Ambassadors,
other public Ministers and Consuls.” 291 By way of this power, “those
286. Id. at 2086 (quoting Am. Ins. Ass’n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 424 (2003)).
287. See supra note 103; see infra note 289.
288. See infra notes 294–306 and accompanying text.
289. EDWARD S. CORWIN, THE PRESIDENT: OFFICE AND POWERS, 1787–1984, at 214 (Randall
W. Bland et al. eds., 5th rev. ed. 1984) (“[T]here is no more securely established principle of
constitutional practice than the exclusive right of the President to be the nation’s intermediary in
its dealing with other nations.”); HENKIN, supra note 272, at 42 (“That the President is the sole
organ of official communication by and to the United States has not been questioned and has not
been a source of significant controversy.”); Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, The
Executive Power over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L. J. 231, 233 (2001) (“It is conventional
wisdom that the President is, at minimum, the ‘sole organ’ of communication with foreign
nations . . . .”); see supra note 103. Only recently has scholarship appeared criticizing the
constitutional moorings of the sole organ doctrine. See, e.g., Sarah H. Cleveland, Crosby and the
“One-Voice” Myth in U.S. Foreign Relations, 46 VILL. L. REV. 975, 975 (2001) (“The ‘onevoice’ doctrine is a myth.”); David H. Moore, Beyond One Voice, 98 MINN. L. REV. 953, 955
(2014) (arguing that the sole organ doctrine’s “contributions are outweighed by its wide-ranging
flaws”).
290. HENKIN, supra note 281, at 41.
291. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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whom [the President] appoints report and are responsible to him; he directs
and instructs them, and determines what they shall communicate and what
they shall withhold.” 292 Additionally, the President has broad authority to
engage in diplomacy and negotiate treaties.293 As is argued in greater depth
below, Professors Prakash and Ramsey posit a different textual basis for the
President’s sole organ power: Article II’s Vesting Clause affirmatively
grants the President “residual power” over foreign affairs, which includes
the sole power over communication with other nations.294
Originalist evidence demonstrates that Chief Justice John Marshall
was not the only ratification-era proponent of the sole organ theory. James
Madison, who advocated for an executive branch tightly controlled by the
legislative branch, still believed that the President’s chief role in foreign
affairs was as an “instrument” of the national legislature.295 The
Washington administration, moreover, “asserted and enjoyed a monopoly
on foreign communications.” 296 In fact, Congress requested that the
Washington administration forward congressional communications to
foreign nations instead of doing so itself. 297 Carrying forward this
ratification-era practice, the Supreme Court has emphasized the primacy of
the President’s role as sole organ of communication.298
The President’s power to effect recognition fits appropriately within
the scope of this power. Recognition is “formal acknowledgment that the
entity possesses the qualifications for statehood.” 299 To effect recognition
is to make a formal acknowledgment, which can be written, oral, or implied
by concluding a treaty or receiving ambassadors.300 Therefore, by its very
nature, the act of effecting recognition is a communicative act. For this
reason, the President’s role as sole organ of communication with foreign
nations naturally encompasses the power to effect recognition. The
Zivotofsky Court, arguing that the President must be the sole voice of
United States’ recognition policy, correctly nested the President’s exclusive
power to effect recognition within the President’s sole organ power.
292. HENKIN, supra note 272, at 41–42. The Zivotofsky Court listed similar considerations as
“traditional avenues of recognition,” in support of its argument that the President has the exclusive
recognition power. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2086 (2015).
293. HENKIN, supra note 272, at 88. But see FISHER, supra note 270, at 249 (“[T]he
negotiation of treaties has often been shared with the Senate in order to secure legislative
understanding and support.”).
294. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 289, at 323.
295. CORWIN, supra note 289, at 210.
296. Saikrishna B. Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey, Foreign Affairs and the Jeffersonian
Executive: A Defense, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1591, 1673 (2005).
297. Id.
298. See supra note 103.
299. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 203
cmt. a (1987).
300. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2084 (2015).
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While the power to effect recognition fits uncontroversially within the
President’s sole organ power, the President’s power to determine
recognition policy implicates a wholly unsettled debate. 301 In Zivotofsky,
the Court aggregated its analysis of the power over recognition policy with
the power over effecting recognition. The Court should have subjected the
question to a more rigorous inquiry. If it had, this Note argues that the
Court would have concluded that the President has the exclusive power to
determine recognition policy through Article II’s Vesting Clause.
The Vesting Clause theory holds that Article II’s Vesting Clause,
which vests the “executive power” in the President, is an affirmative grant
of power. 302 The argument most famously originates with Alexander
Hamilton during the Pacificus-Helvidius debates. 303 Hamilton, writing as
Pacificus, argued that Article II’s Vesting Clause vests not only the duty to
execute legislation, but also comprehends “the whole of Executive Power”
as it was defined at that time. 304 Hamilton’s theory, based on the writings
of Montesquieu, Locke, and Blackstone, held that the executive power
included “independent, major, substantive powers to ‘determine the
condition of the nation in its foreign relations.’” 305 Further, the President
has “all powers that the facts of international intercourse may at anytime
make conveniently applicable if the Constitution does not vest them
elsewhere in clear terms.” 306
The Vesting Clause, in the first instance, is rooted in the text of the
Constitution. Both Articles I and II have vesting clauses, but the two are
distinct: Article I’s Vesting Clause vests Congress with all legislative
powers “herein granted,” 307 but Article II’s Vesting Clause omits those
words. 308 Today, this distinction permits the inference that Congress may
exercise powers only pursuant to those enumerated, and the President is not
subject to that limitation. 309 During the ratification era, however, the
distinction did not depend on inference: it was commonly understood that

301. See, e.g., HENKIN, supra note 272, at 42–43 (“Issues begin to burgeon when the President
claims authority, as ‘sole organ’, to . . . determine also the content of the communication . . . .”);
Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 289, at 251 (“Modern scholarship has thus been unable to address
satisfactorily the question whether the President’s foreign affairs powers include some lawmaking
authority.”).
302. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
303. CORWIN, supra note 289, at 209–10.
304. HENKIN, supra note 272, at 39.
305. Id.
306. CORWIN, supra note 289, at 209–10.
307. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States . . . .”).
308. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
United States of America.”).
309. JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND FOREIGN
AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 18 (2005); Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 289, at 256–57.
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the “executive power” included broad authority over foreign affairs. 310
From this originalist interpretation of “executive power,” modern
proponents of the Vesting Clause theory argue that the President—prior to
ratification—had a general power over foreign affairs. 311 When the
Framers drafted the Constitution, they stripped some powers from the
President’s “executive power” and enumerated them in Article I. 312 As a
result, the President is precluded from regulating foreign commerce,
declaring war, or making laws related to foreign affairs, and cannot enter
into treaties or appoint public officials without the consent of Congress.313
What remains of the President’s residual foreign affairs power in Article
II’s Vesting Clause, however, permits the President to “set and announce
the foreign policy of the federal government.” 314 Indeed, the Vesting
Clause theory explains many conspicuous silences in the Constitution
relating to foreign affairs. 315
Pursuant to the President’s residual foreign affairs power, he has the
exclusive power to determine recognition policy. 316 Historical practice
reflects this. In 1793, President George Washington conferred with his
cabinet on the question of whether he should receive a diplomat from the
post-revolution government of France.317 The cabinet agreed, and
Washington received the French Ambassador “without consultation with or
direction from Congress.” 318 Since that time, the President has unilaterally
determined recognition policy for most of United States’ history. 319 On
most occasions, the President has unilaterally determined recognition policy
towards a foreign sovereign and then effected the recognition without
consulting Congress. 320 Much less often Congress and the President have
collaborated on a recognition issue, and only four times in history has

310. YOO, supra note 309, at 36–45; Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 289, at 266.
311. Prakash & Ramsey, supra note 289, at 252.
312. Id. at 355.
313. Id. at 261.
314. Id. at 355.
315. Justice Thomas relied on a Vesting Clause argument in his concurring opinion.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2097–101 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring).
316. FISHER, supra note 270, at 270 (“The President has constitutional authority to recognize
foreign governments . . . .”); HENKIN, supra note 272, at 43 (“It is no longer questioned that the
President does not merely perform the ceremony of receiving foreign ambassadors but also
determines whether the United States should recognize or refuse to recognize a foreign
government.”).
317. RAMSEY, supra note 272, at 78.
318. Id.
319. Robert J. Reinstein, Is the President’s Recognition Power Exclusive?, 86 TEMP. L. REV.
1, 51 (2013).
320. David Gray Adler, The President’s Recognition Power, in THE CONSTITUTION AND THE
CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY 133, 133–34 (David Gray Adler & Larry N. George
eds., 1996); CORWIN, supra note 289, at 219.
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Congress unilaterally exercised the recognition power.321
Though
longstanding practice is not conclusive evidence of constitutionality, it is
“weighty” evidence of constitutionality. 322 It is also indicative of the
President’s institutional competence to exercise the power. As Professor
Harold Koh explains, Congress is “poorly structured for initiative and
leadership” because it is a bicameral institution made up of individuals,
each subject to pressure from geographically dispersed power bases. 323 The
President, in contrast, can act “swiftly and secretly to respond to fastmoving international events.” 324
Thus, although the Court erred in aggregating the analysis of the
President’s power to determine recognition policy with the President’s
power to effect recognition, the Court correctly concluded that the President
has the exclusive authority to exercise the recognition power.
C. Section 214(d) Does Not Infringe on the President’s Recognition
Power
After the Zivotofsky Court defined the scope of the recognition power,
it held that Congress cannot force the President to “contradict his own
statement[s] regarding a determination of formal recognition.” 325 The
Court’s key reasoning for this conclusion was that the President’s
recognition power was sufficiently exclusive that it “disabl[es] the Congress
from acting upon the subject.” 326 In “disabling” Congress, the Court
invoked Justice Jackson’s exception to Category Three, reserved for
“conclusive and preclusive” claims to Presidential power. 327
The Court erred, however, in promulgating so broad a rule on
infringement. First, the Court’s holding too greatly invades Congress’s
lawmaking power by prohibiting otherwise constitutional acts of

321. Reinstein, supra note 319.
322. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 790 (1983) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S.
664, 678 (1970)).
323. Harold Hongju Koh, Why the President Almost Always Wins in Foreign Affairs, in THE
CONSTITUTION AND THE CONDUCT OF AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, supra note 320, at 158, 159.
324. Id. at 162. Professor Koh also points out that the President may feel pressure to act
quickly and unilaterally because he is accountable to the electorate. Id. at 159; see also CORWIN,
supra note 289, at 201; HENKIN, supra note 272, at 32 (“Unlike Congress, the President is always
‘in session.’ He can act quickly, informally, and secretly.”).
325. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2090 (2015).
326. Id. at 2095 (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637–38
(1952) (Jackson, J., concurring)). Recall that the parties in Zivotofsky agreed that because the
President refused to implement Section 214(d), his power fell into Justice Jackson’s third category
of presidential power, and therefore was at its “lowest ebb.” Id. at 2084.
327. See id. at 2095 (“Although the statement required by § 214(d) would not itself constitute
a formal act of recognition, it is a mandate that the Executive contradict his prior recognition
determination . . . . As a result it is unconstitutional.”).
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Congress. 328 Second, the rule’s intention of preventing Congress from
undermining an act of recognition is shortsighted because Congress can
undermine an act of recognition by acting outside the scope of the rule. The
rule on infringement too greatly invades Congress’ lawmaking power for
too little benefit. The Court should have instead limited the circumstances
of infringement only to formal acts of recognition, thus “disabling”
Congress from exercising formal recognition. Because Section 214(d) is
not an act of formal recognition, the Court should have held that the statute
does not infringe on the President’s recognition power.
The Zivotofsky Court attempts to make a distinction between acts of
Congress that express disagreement with a President’s act of recognition, 329
and acts of Congress that force the President to contradict his own
statements regarding recognition.330 The Court implies that this distinction
matters because if Congress forces the President to contradict an act of
recognition, the recognized country may construe its legitimacy to the
United States government as equivocal.331 Such equivocation concerned
the Court, presumably, because it would undermine the President’s initial
act of recognition and could endanger international relations. The Court
concedes, however, that Congress is free to “express its disagreement” with
an act of recognition by acting or refusing to take action in accordance with
its Article I powers, such as refusing to confirm an ambassador, ease trade
restrictions or consent to a treaty. 332 The Court admits that Congress
expressing disagreement in this way would also undermine a President’s act
of recognition. 333
The assumption underlying this distinction is that an act of Congress
undermining a recognition policy clearly originating from Congress was
tolerable, but an act of Congress undermining a recognition policy
ultimately voiced by the President, somehow, so significantly undermines a
recognition policy that it should be prohibited. This subtle difference is
noted, but it fails to account for the fact that Congress could severely
undermine an act of recognition pursuant to a valid exercise of power—at
least according to the Zivotofsky Court. For example, Congress could
declare war on the country at issue, or refuse to enter into a trade
agreement. 334 It is difficult to understand how a statute allowing U.S.
328. The Court’s holding necessarily and specifically refers to otherwise constitutionally
enacted legislation because the only alternative interpretation—Congress may not enact
independently unconstitutional legislation that forces the President to contradict a statement of
recognition—need not be stated.
329. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2087.
330. Id. at 2090.
331. Id. at 2086.
332. Id. at 2095.
333. Id.
334. Id.
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citizens born in Jerusalem to choose to have “Israel” recorded as the
birthplace on their passports more detrimentally undermines a recognition
policy than other actions that Congress could take. The Court’s rule, which
seeks to protect the President’s recognition policies and United States
foreign relations, does not account for this disparity in reasoning.
Professor Robert Reinstein’s discussion of sole executive agreements
with foreign governments illustrates the danger of allowing presidential
power to trump otherwise constitutional legislation.335 He explains that,
like the recognition power, sole executive agreements have no clear textual
basis in the Constitution. 336 Nevertheless, the President has regularly
entered into sole executive agreements with foreign nations such that, when
unchallenged, it is assumed that the President has the implied authority to
do so. 337 When a sole executive agreement conflicts with federal law,
however, federal law has always prevailed, indicating that despite the
implied power, the President cannot “displace or override the legislative
powers of Congress.” 338 Under this reasoning, the President should not be
able to contravene a statute even if it contradicts a statement on recognition.
After all, it is the President’s duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” 339 Therefore, the Supreme Court should not have created an
exception for the recognition power. As Chief Justice Roberts pointed out,
the Court took “the perilous step—for the first time in our history—of
allowing the President to defy an Act of Congress in the field of foreign
affairs.” 340
The Zivotofsky Court appeared to disregard Justice Jackson’s
admonition that “what is at stake is the equilibrium established by our
constitutional system.” 341 Although the President’s recognition power is
both “conclusive and preclusive,” the Court went too far in defining how it
could “disable” Congress from acting. Instead, the Court should have
limited its rule of infringement to only an exercise of the recognition power
by any branch of the government besides the President. By effectively
prohibiting otherwise constitutional legislation that falls in the Court’s new
category of “forced contradictory statements,” the Court unconstitutionally
strips away Congress’s lawmaking authority and expands the President’s
power over recognition. In doing so, the Court undermined its own

335. Reinstein, supra note 319, at 53–54.
336. Id. at 53.
337. Id.
338. Id. at 54; see also id.at 54 n.364.
339. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
340. Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2116 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
341. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 638 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
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assurances that Congress has a role to play in foreign affairs and,
ultimately, backslid toward Curtiss-Wright. 342
D. Congress Had Constitutional Authority to Enact Section 214(d)
Under the Foreign Commerce Clause
Zivotofsky brought suit to enforce Section 214(d). Because Section
214(d) does not infringe on the recognition power, the Court should have
addressed whether Congress had authority to enact the statute. As discussed
above, the Supreme Court has not directly addressed Congress’s
constitutional authority to enact passport legislation. 343 Congress has,
however, enacted legislation relating to passport regulation for more than
two centuries, and, in the vast majority of cases involving such legislation,
the Court has assumed Congress has the authority to do so. 344 Even in
Zivotofsky, the Court expressly acknowledged that it did not “question the
power of Congress to enact passport legislation of wide scope,” pursuant to
the “extensive lawmaking power the Constitution vests in Congress over
the Nation’s foreign affairs.” 345 While longstanding practice is not
conclusive evidence of constitutionality, 346 the strong inference that may be
gleaned from Congress’s ongoing practice of enacting passport legislation
is that it has some authority to do it.347
This Part argues that Congress has that authority under the Foreign
Commerce Clause. The Zivotofsky Court could have easily upheld Section
214(d) as a proper exercise of congressional power under the Foreign
Commerce Clause. 348 The statute, which concerns the place of birth of a
passport bearer, regulates the content of passports, which in turn regulates
human movement through channels of foreign commerce. Additionally,
passports are instruments of foreign commerce. 349
Lower courts have held that a person traveling internationally is
“traveling in foreign commerce.” In United States v. Clark, 350 the Ninth
Circuit addressed the constitutionality of a statute prohibiting a person who
“travels in foreign commerce” from engaging in “illicit sexual conduct with
another person.” 351 The court explained that “travels in foreign commerce”
unambiguously invokes the Foreign Commerce Clause, and by traveling by
342. See supra note 218.
343. See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
344. See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
345. Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2096 (majority opinion).
346. HENKIN, supra note 272, at 45.
347. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 401 (1989) (holding that a 200-year-old practice
is evidence of constitutionality).
348. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
349. See infra note 360 and accompanying text.
350. 435 F.3d 1100 (9th Cir. 2006).
351. Id. at 1104 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2423(c) (2012)).
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plane from the United States to Cambodia, the defendant satisfied the
“travels in foreign commerce” element of the statute. 352 The Fifth Circuit,
too, has explained, “Congress intended foreign commerce to mean travel to
or from, or at least some form of contact with, a foreign state.” 353
The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Clark has sparked debate over the
reach of the Foreign Commerce Clause. 354 The focus of the criticism,
however, is not whether traveling internationally, or through “channels of
foreign commerce,” is sufficient to invoke the Foreign Commerce
Clause. 355 Instead, Clark’s holding is controversial because it grants
Congress jurisdiction over conduct in foreign countries after the
individual’s use of the channel of foreign commerce has ceased.356
Describing “travel in foreign commerce” as a “jurisdictional hook,”
commentators caution that courts should not so broadly define the Foreign
Commerce Clause such that it extends to all conduct in foreign nations. 357
Notably, the commentators do not challenge Congress’s authority to
regulate foreign travel by regulating foreign travel itself. 358
Passport regulation falls squarely within Congress’s power to regulate
people traveling through channels of foreign commerce. Under federal law,
a person may not enter or exit the United States without a valid passport. 359
By controlling who can enter and exit the country, passport regulation is the
direct regulation of people engaging in foreign travel. The implications of
passport regulation, moreover, are not as controversial as the statute in
Clark; passports regulate human travel through channels of foreign
commerce, and have little to do—if anything—with human conduct in
foreign countries after the travel has ceased. In this sense, passport
regulation is relatively insular—it concerns a travel document that serves as
identification specifically intended to facilitate the safe journey of United
States citizens through channels of foreign commerce. Moreover, the
352. Id. at 1114.
353. United States v. Montford, 27 F.3d 137, 139–40 (5th Cir. 1994).
354. See Anthony J. Colangelo, The Foreign Commerce Clause, 96 VA. L. REV. 949, 999
(2010) (arguing that the statute in Clark does not establish a sufficient nexus between foreign
travel, which is subject to the foreign commerce power, and illegal conduct subsequent to that
travel, which is not necessarily within the foreign commerce power); Julie Buffington, Note,
Taking the Ball and Running With It: U.S. v. Clark and Congress’s Unlimited Power Under the
Foreign Commerce Clause, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 841, 858 (2006) (arguing that Congress should not
have broader power to regulate conduct abroad pursuant to the Foreign Commerce Clause than it
has in regulating citizen’s interstate conduct).
355. Colangelo, supra note 354, at 997.
356. Id.
357. See id. at 999–1000 (“To uphold Section 2423(c) on a channels-of-commerce theory
therefore is a radical move, and would mean that any time a U.S. citizen or permanent resident
travels in foreign commerce, every subsequent act by that individual is within Congress’s
regulatory authority.”).
358. Id. at 997.
359. 8 U.S.C. § 1185 (2012).
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passport book itself is an instrumentality of foreign commerce. The
Eleventh Circuit has defined instrumentalities of interstate commerce as
“the people and things moving in commerce,” including cars, airplanes,
boats, pagers, telephones, mobile phones and shipments of goods. 360 Just as
a car, airplane or boat is means that facilitate a person’s travel through
channels of foreign commerce, so, too, is a passport.
Turning to Section 214(d) specifically, the statute is passport
legislation that falls within the scope of the Foreign Commerce Clause. The
statute, which allows a United States citizen born in Jerusalem to designate
his or her place of birth as “Israel,” independently passes constitutional
muster because it regulates an aspect of the passport that relates to the
identity of the bearer. Determining the identity of a passport bearer directly
relates to the passport’s purpose of safe and effective regulation of people
moving through channels of foreign commerce. According to the State
Department Foreign Affairs Manual, the “place of birth” designation is an
integral part of establishing an individual’s identity. 361 It distinguishes that
individual from other persons with similar names and/or dates of birth, and
helps identify claimants attempting to use another person’s identity. 362 The
information also facilitates retrieval of passport records that assists the
Department in determining citizenship or notifying next of kin in case of
emergency. 363 Thus, as the State Department acknowledges, the birthplace
of a passport bearer is integral to the safe international travel of United
States citizens. 364
One might argue that Section 214(d) does not have the objective of
regulating foreign commerce; after all, the name of the section of the
provision is “United States Policy with Respect to Jerusalem as the Capital
of Israel.” 365 The Supreme Court has held, however, that if Congress is
directly regulating foreign commerce or an instrumentality of foreign
commerce, Congress’s objective of the legislation is irrelevant.366 In
360. United States v. Ballinger, 395 F.3d 1218, 1226 (11th Cir. 2005).
OF
STATE,
7
FAM
§
1310(g)
app.
D
(2015),
361. U.S.
DEP’T
https://fam.state.gov/FAM/07FAM/07FAM1300apD.html.
362. Id.
363. Id.
364. See also Eugene Kontorovich, The Article I Power in Zivotofsky v. Kerry, WASH. POST
(Oct. 30, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/10/30/thearticle-i-power-in-zivotosfky-v-kerry/ (arguing that the “place of birth” field on passports is to
help repatriate and protect Americans while traveling).
365. Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003, Pub. L. No. 107-228, § 214(d),
116 Stat. 1350, 1365–1366 (2002).
366. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 250 (1964) (holding that
although the “fundamental object” of the statute at issue was to vindicate racial discrimination in
public accommodations, the statute was a valid exercise of the commerce power); United States v.
Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114–15 (1941) (upholding the Fair Labor Standards Act as a proper exercise
of the commerce power despite its principal purpose as discouraging substandard labor
conditions).
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United States v. Darby, 367 the Court declared, “Whatever their motive and
purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe on some
constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on
Congress by the Commerce Clause.” 368 Under this reasoning, even if
Section 214(d) does not advance a specific foreign commerce objective, it is
constitutional if it regulates foreign commerce and does not infringe on
some other constitutional limitation. The statute, as has been established,
directly regulates information pertaining to the identification of its bearer,
which has integral importance to the effective regulation of people traveling
through channels of foreign commerce. Thus, regardless of whether the
birthplace designation on a person’s passport promotes foreign commerce,
it directly regulates the channels of foreign commerce by controlling who
can pass through them. To conclude, Congress had proper authority under
the Foreign Commerce Clause to enact Section 214(d).
V. CONCLUSION
In Zivotofsky v. Kerry, the Supreme Court struck down Section 214(d)
as an unconstitutional invasion of the President’s exclusive recognition
power. 369 Lacking doctrine to guide its analysis, the Court relied primarily
on theoretical principles to reach its decision.370 Specifically, the Court
rejected the pervasive dicta of United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export
Corp., edging the theoretical framework to a more balanced division of
power. 371 On the merits, the Court held that the President had the exclusive
recognition power, citing the need for the nation to speak with “one voice”
on issues of recognition. 372 Additionally, the Court concluded that
Congress could force the President to contradict statements on
recognition. 373 Though the Court reached the correct conclusion on the
issue of recognition, it erred on defining what constitutes infringement of
the recognition power. In a thinly veiled attempt to extend the reach of the
recognition power to Section 214(d), the Court unconstitutionally stripped
some of Congress’s lawmaking powers. Despite the Court’s efforts to
correct the wrongs of Curtiss-Wright, the Court failed to live by its own
lesson. Ultimately, the Court should have upheld Section 214(d) and
ordered the State Department issue a passport to Zivotofsky with his
birthplace recorded as “Israel.”
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370.
371.
372.
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312 U.S. 100 (1941).
Id. at 115.
Zivotofsky v. Kerry, 135 S. Ct. 2076, 2083 (2015).
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part IV.A.
Zivotofsky, 135 S. Ct. at 2087.
Id. at 2090.

904

MARYLAND LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 75:865

Section 214(d) is inarguably troublesome. It contradicts longstanding
United States policy as to the status of Jerusalem, and will likely be
interpreted by some as an equivocation on our policy. The goal of this Note
is not to discount the sensitivity of the political climate in the Middle East,
nor to advocate for any change in the government’s policy with respect to
Jerusalem. The focus instead is on the importance of striking the delicate
balance of power between the political branches—especially with respect to
constitutional issues of first impression.
Zivotofsky highlights the
challenging decisions that the Court must make in absence of textual
guidance. In no small way, the Court in Zivotofsky had to choose between
the United States’ unwavering policy as to the status of Jerusalem and the
integrity of its separation of powers jurisprudence. The Court chose the
former, at the cost of the latter.

